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Given the costs to real output that inflation uncertainty has been shown to impose, two 
recent papers have investigated the interaction of inflation and uncertainty for a group of 
emerging market nations. Both papers find that an increase in inflation almost invariably 
increases uncertainty in developing countries. This finding accords with the Friedman 
hypothesis and with most results for industrialized countries. However, there is both 
theoretical and some tentative empirical evidence suggesting that, when inflation is high, and 
thus costly, an increase in inflation can spur greater investment in predicting the path of 
prices, and actually reduce rather than increase uncertainty. This possibility is particularly 
relevant for emerging markets, some of which have histories of high inflation. Using a 
somewhat different empirical methodology than previous authors, we find that inflation does 
indeed lower uncertainty at some horizons, and, as per theory, does so predominantly in 
those countries in our sample with the higher rates of inflation.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Inflation and its related uncertainty can impose costs on real economic output 
(Friedman (1977), Grier, Olekalns, Shields and Henry (2004), Grier and Grier (2006)). 
For emerging markets, these costs may be higher than those in industrialized nations. 
Although hyperinflation is a thing of the past in most developing countries, inflation is 
still higher than desired in many such nations. In particular, the poor residents of 
developing countries may be relatively unable to hedge against the costs of rising prices 
and inflation, when combined with other distortions such as misaligned nominal 
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exchange rates may cause harmful real exchange rate overvaluation. Some researchers 
also find that when inflation combines with distortions such as interest rate controls it 
inhibits financial market development in LDCs (Barnes and Duquette (2006)). 
Given the importance of inflation dynamics, a number of papers have investigated 
the interactions of inflation and uncertainty in the U.S., Europe and Japan (Caporale and 
McKiernan (1997), Grier and Grier (2006), Grier and Perry (1998), Wilson (2006)). 
There have only been two multi-country investigations of inflation and uncertainty for 
emerging markets, however (Daal, Naka, and Sanchez (2005), and Thornton (2007)). 
Both employ GARCH estimation, which has been demonstrated as superior to the older 
method of using the unconditional variance of inflation as a proxy for uncertainty. 
However, there are a number of different GARCH-type models, and each of the two 
papers imposes one particular kind of GARCH model, without a clear rationale. This 
makes the results questionable, and indeed, the two authors find opposite results for 
some countries regarding the effects of uncertainty on inflation. 
Imposing an incorrect GARCH model on the inflation process can result in incorrect 
inference. Accordingly, in this study we investigate a number of GARCH models for 
developing countries, and after allowing for flexible selection of the ARMA process, 
choose the GARCH model that exhibits the greatest likelihood (as will be discussed, 
standard model selection criteria such as SIC, adjusted  , etc. are inapplicable to 
GARCH models). We then investigate inflation for ten developing countries, and find 
results that contradict both of the previous authors. These results are important given the 
relatively high inflation rates in many of the countries in the study and they are 
suggestive that the cost of inflation is indeed higher in these LDCs than previous studies 
have indicated. 
2 R
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section details the previous literature on the 
theory and empirics of inflation and uncertainty. The third section describes our data and 
methodology. The fourth section discusses the results, and the fifth section concludes. 
 
 
2.  PREVIOUS  LITERATURE 
 
The seminal paper on the impact of inflation on uncertainty was by Friedman (1977). 
He argued that when inflation rises, agents are uncertain as to whether policymakers will 
endeavor to lower price increases, and thus uncertainty over the future price path rises. 
Ball (1992) formalizes Friedman’s argument in a theoretical model. Thus the 
Friedman-Ball hypothesis states that there is a positive impact of inflation on inflation 
uncertainty. 
At the same time, there can also be an impact of inflation uncertainty on inflation 
itself. Cukierman (1992) employs a Barro-Gordon framework to show that an increase in 
uncertainty raises the optimal inflation rate. Thus Cukierman posits a positive impact of 
uncertainty on inflation. 
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the level of inflation itself. While a low or moderate level of inflation may be neutral for 
long run output, uncertainty can have a negative effect on income. Friedman points to 
the deleterious effect inflation uncertainty has on the information content of prices and 
hence on exchange, and Cabellero (1991) points out that higher uncertainty can lower 
investment and hence output. 
This negative impact of uncertainty on output is more than a theoretical possibility. 
Grier, Henry, Olekalns and Shields (2004) find a negative impact of inflation uncertainty 
on growth in the United States, while Grier and Grier (2006) find a negative impact of 
uncertainty on income growth in Mexico.   
Given that inflation uncertainty negatively impacts output, Holland (1995) advances 
the opposite hypothesis of Cukierman-namely, that an increase in inflation uncertainty 
should lower inflation. Holland argues that policy makers are aware of the high costs of 
uncertainty, and thus when uncertainty rises, some central banks may make strong 
efforts to lower inflation, and thus uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty on inflation is 
therefore theoretically ambiguous. 
Accordingly, some previous empirical studies find mixed results regarding the effect 
of uncertainty on inflation, with a positive impact for some countries, and a negative 
effect for others (see Grier and Perry (1998), Daal, Naka and Sanchez (2005) and 
Thornton (2007)). On the other hand, most studies find that there is an almost uniformly 
positive effect of inflation on uncertainty. 
However, Pouregami and Maskus (1987) argue that if the cost of inflation is 
sufficiently high, agents will invest more resources into correctly forecasting price 
changes in response to an increase in inflation. This may be the case for many 
developing countries, in which a high level of inflation can extract high economic costs. 
Pouregami and Maskus (1990) find, in a sample of seven Latin American countries, that 
higher inflation raises the size of inflation forecast errors in Brazil and Peru, but lowers 
these errors in Argentina, a notoriously high inflation country where failure to correctly 
anticipate price changes can wreak large economic costs.   
Ungar and Zilberfarb (1993) develop a formal model in which the effect of inflation 
on uncertainty depends on the costs of inflation versus the cost of gathering information 
to forecast inflation. Thus unlike in the Friedman-Ball scenario, an increase in inflation 
may decrease uncertainty if inflation is sufficiently costly relative to the costs of 
obtaining information to generate more accurate predictions. 
The potentially negative effect of inflation on uncertainty, due to the cost of inflation 
being sufficiently high to offset costs of information-gathering and forecasting, may be 
particularly relevant for emerging market countries, as opposed to industrialized nations. 
Bruno and Easterly (1998), and Khan and Senhadji (2000) document that high levels of 
inflation exert a negative effect on growth while low levels of inflation do not. Emerging 
market countries have higher levels of inflation and thus are more likely to suffer from 
the costs of inflation. 
Thus, just as the effect of uncertainty on inflation is theoretically ambiguous, so too 
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generally find a positive effect of inflation on uncertainty (Grier and Perry (1998) find 
the impact is uniformly positive in the G-7), the impact in developing nations may not 
be so uniform. 
In order to investigate the impact of inflation and uncertainty on each other, some 
empirical proxy for uncertainty must be obtained. A traditional measure of inflation 
uncertainty has been the variance of inflation, but Grier and Grier (2006) note that 
inflation can be both highly variable and predictable. A subsequent measure of 
uncertainty was the variance of different forecasters’ predictions of inflation (Holland, 
1993). 
Grier and Grier (2006), however, point out that the variance of inflation forecasts 
may be a flawed measure of uncertainty. The authors note that each forecaster may have 
a large confidence interval around their point forecast, but that the collective forecasts 
may show little variability.     
Most modern investigations of inflation uncertainty thus employ GARCH models. 
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Here,    is the conditional variance, and    is white noise, so that the residual   
still has an expected value of zero. We interpret the time-varying ARCH variance as 
inflation uncertainty. This has become standard practice in modern studies on inflation 
uncertainty (Grier and Grier (2006), Grier and Perry (1998), Daal, Naka and Sanchez 
(2005), Thornton (2007)). For modeling convenience, rather than the AR process 
indicated in Equation (3), the conditional variance is sometimes specified as an ARMA 
(or GARCH) process: 
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industrialized countries, only two multi-country studies have been carried out for the 
developing world. Daal, Naka and Sanchez (2005, DNS hereafter) investigate inflation 
and uncertainty for fifteen emerging markets, as well as the G-7 economies, while 
Thornton (2007) examines these interactions for twelve developing countries. DNS find 
that, in all developing countries, the effect of inflation on uncertainty is positive, and 
significant in all cases but one (Peru). Thornton’s results similarly indicate a positive 
effect, although in two cases (Colombia and Israel) the effect is negative at twelve lags, 
but positive at eight and four lags.     
Thus existing results would seem to indicate that the Pouregami and Maskus (1987, 
1990) and Ungar and Zilbefarb (1993) hypothesis of a potential negative effect of 
inflation on uncertainty is essentially irrelevant, even in developing countries where the 
cost of inflation is potentially quite high. Indeed, none of the three papers just mentioned 
is cited in either DNS or Thornton.     
However, the results of DNS and Thornton may be due to misspecification. Each 
imposes a particular ARMA and GARCH model on all of the countries under 
investigation, despite the fact that there are many potential ARMA and GARCH models 
which may be optimal in each nation. Indeed, upon reflection, it is extremely unlikely 
that inflation and uncertainty dynamics are the same in each nation. There is one 
GARCH model imposed on all countries in each paper, but the models are different 
between the two papers, and the two studies reach different conclusions for certain 
countries on the effect of uncertainty on inflation.     
Given that the two papers impose different models uniformly on all countries with 
little statistical rationale, and have conflicting results for particular countries on how 
inflation and uncertainty interact, we will we will employ a more flexible approach. We 
will allow each country to have its own ARMA-GARCH model, as again it is highly 
unlikely that inflation dynamics are identical for each. Moreover, our results will differ 
from both DNS and Thornton for a number of countries. In particular, we find that in 
those countries with the highest inflation in our sample, inflation negatively impacts 
uncertainty, bolstering the hypothesis of Pouregami and Maskus. 
 
 
3.  DATA  AND  METHODOLOGY 
 
We obtain data on consumer prices from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database. We have data on the following countries: Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela, from 1957:1 through 2006:11, India from 1957:4 through 2006:10, 
Indonesia from 1968:2 through 2006:11, Korea from 1970:2 through 2006:11, Thailand 
from 1965:2 through 2006:11, and Turkey from 1970:1 through 2006:10. It should be 
noted that both DNS and Thornton also have differing sample periods for the countries 
in their studies. 
We next turn to specifying the ARMA-GARCH model for each country. Again, it is 
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appropriate that each country be allowed its own possible model. In contrast, DNS begin 
their modeling procedure by imposing on each nation an ARMA (p, 1, 12) specification. 
That is, the number of AR parameters is allowed to vary by country, but all nations have 
first and twelfth MA terms. Thornton does allow for a varying number of AR terms in 
different countries, but does not allow for any MA parameters. 
In this paper, we fit ARMA models by first examining which ARMA model leads to 
the lowest AIC and SIC for each country. We then determine whether one or both of the 
models chosen by these criterion display uncorrelated residuals. If so, that will be the 
model chosen. If the best model by these selection criteria still display autocorrelation, 
we experiment with various AR and MA lags until the residuals appear to be white noise, 
and this will be the ARMA portion of the GARCH model. The only exception will be 
Venezuela, for which no model can be found which “whitens” the residuals, and thus the 
model chosen by the SIC will be employed. 
The next step is to specify a GARCH model. DNS impose a Power-GARCH 
(PARCH) model on all the countries in their paper. Thornton employs a standard 
GARCH(1,1) model. Again, these impositions assume that the conditional volatility of 
inflation follows an identical model specification across all countries.     
There are many different types of GARCH models, and imposing just one type on all 
countries can lead to serious misspecification. Different GARCH models have been 
developed to capture different types of behavior on the part of the changing volatility in 
economic and financial variables. While we cannot examine every possible GARCH 
specification, we will choose from three, which address issues of asymmetry in inflation 
shocks, avoidance of non-negativity constraints and capturing long-term persistence in 
inflation volatility. 
A standard GARCH(1,1) model, as in Equation (4), has been most commonly 
applied (Bollerslev (1986)). This model often captures most of the conditional volatility 
in a series, in that a series that is fitted with a GARCH(1,1) specification often has no 
remaining ARCH effects in its residuals. Caporale and McKiernan (1997) and Grier and 
Perry (1998) apply the GARCH(1,1) model in studying inflation and uncertainty in the 
U.S. and all G-7 countries, respectively. Thornton (2007) applies this model to twelve 
emerging market nations. 
There are some shortcomings of the standard GARCH model, however, and several 
researchers have developed different specifications designed to overcome these 
problems. First, as the variance can never be negative, the model requires non-negativity 
constraints on the parameters in Equation (4). All of the a’s and β’s being non-negative 
is a sufficient condition for non-negativity. Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients 
may actually be negative (Nelson (1991)) and restricting the sample parameters in this 
way “may unduly restrict the dynamics of the conditional variance process” (Nelson, p. 
347), and thus lead to poor specification. 
Another and potentially more serious drawback of the standard GARCH model is 
that it imposes symmetric effects of positive and negative inflation shocks. That is, a 
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Brunner and Hess (1993) argue that this would be contrary to the Friedman hypothesis. 
Indeed, it is easy to imagine that agents become more certain over the future path of 
inflation if the central bank successfully disinflates. 
Finally, a potentially important issue for inflation dynamics is the often persistent 
nature of the conditional variance. Several GARCH models have been proposed to 
capture a level of persistence in volatility that the standard GARCH model fails to 
incorporate. Engle and Lee (1999), for instance, developed the Component-GARCH 
(C-GARCH) model to capture the “long memory” property of stock returns. 
Again, there are many GARCH models designed to address these issues in economic 
data. While we cannot fit each inflation series to every possible GARCH model, we will 
fit each country’s inflation to four GARCH models which have become quite prominent 
and which address such issues. First, we will examine the GARCH(1,1) model. As noted, 
this has been a workhorse in the literature, and is the specification Thornton (2007) 
chose for his study of emerging markets. 
The second model is known as exponential-GARCH, or E-GARCH (Nelson, 1991). 
It is specified as: 
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Since the model is in log form, the value of    can never be negative, and thus this 
specification allows for negative parameter values. Perhaps more importantly, an 
E-GARCH process can exhibit asymmetric behavior; if    is positive, the effect 
of a shock on the conditional variance is  . If however, there is a negative shock, 
the effect on the conditional variance is  . Since it is quite possible that positive 
shocks to inflation raise uncertainty more than negative innovations, this model may be 
more appropriate than the standard GARCH. Wilson (2006) employs this specification 
in modeling inflation and uncertainty in Japan. 
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Additionally, the Power-ARCH (PARCH) model, developed by Ding, Engle and 
Granger (1993) is also capable of capturing asymmetric effects of positive and negative 
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Since DNS employed this model in their study, we will do so as well. We also set the 
parameter  δ   equal to 2 as is done in the DNS study. 
Finally, the conditional volatility of inflation may be highly persistent and standard 
GARCH models may under-estimate this persistence. There are a number of models 
designed to deal with this persistence. The aforementioned Component GARCH 
(C-GARCH) model of Engle and Lee captures long memory in volatility by replacing WILLIAM MILES AND SAMUEL SCHREYER  176 
the conditional variance in (4) with two different components: 
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Unlike a typical GARCH model (4), in which the conditional variance reverts to a 
long run mean,    in the case of (4), in the component GARCH specification the level 
to which   reverts,  , is time varying. Thus Equation (7) represents the transitory 
component of the conditional variance, while (8) captures the long memory portion of 
volatility. Grier and Perry (1998) applied this model to inflation and uncertainty in G-7 
nations, so we will see if it applies to inflation and uncertainty in emerging market 
nations. 
0 a
t h t ρ
After fitting the ARMA portion of our inflation models, we will estimate all four 
types of GARCH models, and choose the one with the highest likelihood. This is not a 
formal test, but it gives some indication of the best model, and is better than imposing 
one model on all of the countries. The reason for choosing the model with the greatest 
likelihood is that, while criteria such as AIC and SIC are useful for models of the 
conditional mean, Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson (1994) point out that their statistical 
properties are unknown for GARCH models (see also Enders (2004, pp. 135-136) for a 
discussion). 
Then, once the ARMA-GARCH model has been selected, we will follow DNS and 
Thornton and perform Granger-causality tests between inflation and the estimated 
conditional variances. This will allow for the testing of hypotheses at the four, eight and 
twelve month lag levels, as in Thornton. 
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Table 1 lists the ARMA models for the ten countries under study. In five of the ten 
cases (Argentina, Korea, Peru, Thailand and Turkey), the model chosen by the SIC 
criterion leads to no remaining autocorrelation, and is thus employed. In one other case, 
Venezuela, the SIC-chosen model is used, despite the existence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals, since, despite repeated experimenting, autocorrelation remains. In the 
remaining four countries, neither the models chosen by the AIC or SIC criteria led to 
uncorrelated residuals, so experimentation led to the models that were eventually chosen, 
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Table 1.  ARMA  Models 
Country  ARMA Model  Serial Correlation LM Test P-Value 
Argentina ARMA(5,2)*  0.479 
Colombia AR(8)  0.725 
India AR(5)  0.103 
Indonesia AR(6)  0.566 
Korea ARMA(2,1)*  0.349 
Mexico AR(9)  0.173 
Peru AR(2)*  0.255 
Turkey ARMA(1,2)*  0.795 
Thailand ARMA(6,9)*  0.424 
Venezuela ARMA(2,12)*  0.036 
Note: An asterisk indicates a model chosen by the SIC criterion. 
 
 
We then proceeded to estimate GARCH, E-GARCH, PARCH and C-GARCH 
models. For Indonesia, none of the models led to convergence in the parameter estimates, 
so we proceed with the other nine nations. As displayed in Table 2, for three nations, 
(Colombia, India and Venezuela) PARCH is the best model, in two (Argentina, Peru) 
E-GARCH is chosen, in two others (Korea and Thailand) standard GARCH achieves the 
highest likelihood, and finally in two countries (Mexico and Turkey) C-GARCH is the 
best specification. We then obtain estimates of inflation uncertainty with the conditional 
variance, and perform Granger-causality tests of the impact of inflation and uncertainty 
on each other. Results are displayed in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2.  GARCH  Models 
Country Coefficient P-Value  Country Coefficient P-Value 
Argentina     Peru    
E-GARCH     E-GARCH   
0 a   -0.056 0.000  0 a   -0.515 0.000 
1 a   0.87 0.000  1 a   0.944 0.000 
γ   0.202 0.002  γ   0.37 0.005 
β   0.97 0.000  β   0.96 0.000 
Colombia     Thailand    
PARCH    GARCH    
0 a   0.00009 0.5312  0 a   1.81 0.06 
1 a   0.069 0.0004  1 a   0.09 0.013 
ϕ   -0.39 0.035  β   0.878 0.000 
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India     Turkey    
PARCH     C-GARCH   
0 a   0.024 0.112  1 a   0.392 0.294 
1 a   0.031 0.9  1 β   0.583 0.14 
ϕ   -0.95 0.901  1 α   3385 0.591 
β   0.905 0.000  2 α   0.99 0.000 
   3 α   0.0766 0.858 
Korea     Venezuela    
GARCH     PARCH    
0 a   5.49 0.1843  0 a   0.045 0.008 
1 a   0.195 0.002  1 a   0.292 0.0025 
β   0.758 0.000  ϕ   -0.508 0.01 
    β   0.686 0.000 
Mexico        
C-GARCH        
1 a   0.484 0.000     
1 β   0.512 0.000     
1 α   991.6 0.000     
2 α   1.00 0.000     
3 α   -0.113 0.009     
 
 
As in DNS, we will perform Granger Causality tests to determine whether, at each 
given lag length, inflation affects uncertainty, and vice-versa, and then use the sign of 
the sum of the coefficients on the individual lags to determine whether the effect is 
positive or negative. In some cases, of course, the signs on the coefficients will 
conflict-some being positive, and others negative. In a few cases, where the sum is 
negligibly positive or negative, we will report this as a wash. We believe this is more 
accurate than falsely claiming a very significant effect based on an infinitesimally small 
positive or negative sum. 
For Argentina, at twelve lags, inflation and uncertainty both Granger-cause each 
other, but in both cases there are conflicting signs on the estimated parameters and the 
net effect is roughly a wash. At four and eight lags, inflation has a net negative effect on 
uncertainty. This accords with the idea that, given Argentina’s inflation history, it is 
extremely costly for agents to underestimate the impact of a rise in prices. Accordingly, 
a rise in the price level leads to increased resources being devoted to forecasting and 
other hedging activities, and actually lowers uncertainty, contrary to the Friedman-Ball 
hypothesis. For Colombia, an increase in inflation lowers uncertainty at all lags. Indeed, 
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negative impact of inflation on uncertainty over some horizon, and three of the five 
nations in which there is a uniformly positive impact of prices on uncertainty (Korea, 
India and Thailand) are the nations with the lowest average inflation rates in our sample 
(see Table 3). These findings bolster Pouregami and Maskus’ (1987, 1990) results 
indicating that in high inflation countries, an increase in inflation may actually result in 
better forecasts of the future price path. 
 
 
Table 3.  Granger  Causality  Results 
 Friedman-Ball  Cukierman 
Argentina    
Four Lags  620***(-)
  43.11***(-) 
Eight Lags  560***(-) 80.59***(-) 
Twelve Lags  500.1***(ns)  83.74***(ns) 
Colombia    
Four Lags  63.3***(-)  1.36 
Eight Lags  29.8***(-)  2.51**(+) 
Twelve Lags  21.5***(-) 7.84***(-) 
India    
Four Lags  117***(+)  2.92**(-) 
Eight Lags  65.7***(+) 2.44**(ns) 
Twelve Lags  44.3***(+) 2.36***(ns) 
Korea    
Four Lags  43.5***(+) 4.81***(+) 
Eight Lags  23***(+) 1.69*(+) 
Twelve Lags  15.1***(+) 1.02 
Mexico    
Four Lags  24.95***(+) 2.98**(ns) 
Eight Lags  18.1***(+)  3.043***(-) 
Twelve Lags  10.85***(+) 8.36***(+) 
Peru    
Four Lags  1252***(-) 9.3***(-) 
Eight Lags  643***(+)  6.1***(-) 
Twelve Lags  468***(-) 33.3***(-) 
Turkey    
Four Lags  361***(+)  8.75***(-) 
Eight Lags  239***(+) 5.43***(+) 
Twelve Lags  164***(+)  4.6***(-) 
Thailand    
Four Lags  50.5***(+) 4.5***(+) 
Eight Lags  29.8***(+) 2.3**(+) 
Twelve Lags  20.9***(+) 3.8***(+) 
Venezuela    WILLIAM MILES AND SAMUEL SCHREYER  180 
Four Lags  68***(-) 2.3*(-) 
Eight Lags  35.7***(+)  2.6***(-) 
Twelve Lags  32.8***(+)  22.8***(-) 
Notes: The Friedman-Ball results are the test statistics for the hypothesis that inflation has no effect on 
uncertainty. The Cukierman results are the test statistics for the hypothesis that uncertainty has no effect on 
inflation. * denotes significance at the ten percent level, ** denotes significance at the five percent level, and 
*** denotes significance at the one percent level. The term (ns) denotes no clear positive or negative sign. 
 
 
It is also important to note that this negative estimated impact of inflation on 
uncertainty in the high inflation countries in our sample contradicts the existing 
empirical results of DNS (2005) and Thornton (2007). DNS find, after having imposed 
an ARMA(p, 1,12)-PARCH(1,1) model on all nations, that inflation always significantly 
raises uncertainty for all nine of the emerging markets in our sample, as well as all other 
emerging markets that these authors investigate (the one exception is Peru, where the 
effect is positive, but not significant). Thornton (2007), after imposing an 
AR-GARCH(1,1) model on all countries, finds that there is a negative effect of inflation 
on uncertainty only in Colombia, and only at twelve lags. For four and eight lags, 
Thornton finds that inflation has a positive impact on uncertainty, unlike in our model 
(Thornton also found a negative effect of inflation on uncertainty for Israel at twelve 
lags, but we did not include it in our sample as its status as an emerging market is very 
questionable). Thus, by allowing for different dynamics in inflation and uncertainty 
across countries, we have found results that confirm the theory and empirical findings of 
Ungar and Zilberfarb and Pouregami and Maskus, that higher inflation induces greater 
efforts to forecast prices changes. 
In investigating the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis, we find that uncertainty 
typically lowers inflation in Argentina. This finding accords with that of DNS. In 
Colombia, India, Korea and Mexico, the impact of uncertainty on inflation is mixed, 
varying by the number of lags. In Peru, the effect is clearly negative, which contradicts 
the DNS results (Thornton did not include Peru in his study). For Turkey, the impact is 
mixed, while both DNS and Thornton find a negative impact. In Thailand, the effect is 
always positive, while in Venezuela it is unambiguously negative, and the latter finding 
accords with DNS. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
At first glance, finding that inflation actually lowers uncertainty in high inflation 
countries may suggest that price stability is less of a concern in emerging markets. Since 
much of the real cost of inflation arises from uncertainty, if agents are able to better 
forecast price changes in the face of greater inflation, the negative impact of inflation 
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However, these results, and recent inflation developments in emerging markets offer 
no reason for complacency. That agents in high inflation LDCs devote resources to 
generating accurate predictions suggests that inflation, especially when inaccurately 
forecast, indeed extracts substantial costs. Moreover, the resources devoted to reducing 
uncertainty clearly have alternative uses, especially in developing countries still 
struggling to escape poverty and increase growth. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that after making much progress in the last two decades in 
lowering inflation, prices are rising again in many emerging markets in the wake of the 
commodity boom and lax monetary conditions. While the prior disinflation of past years 
may have shifted the Phillips curve relationship inward, it also may have pivoted the 
curve, giving it a flatter slope. This has been the experience in other countries (Ball 
Mankiw and Romer (1988), Walsh (1995). See Walsh, 1995 for a discussion of the 
theoretical reasons why a successful disinflation makes subsequent disinflations more 
costly in terms of lost output). Thus if higher inflation does again take hold, it could be 
more costly than in earlier years in terms of lost output to get prices back under control.   
Thus, while for some high inflation developing countries, an increase in inflation 
may not increase damaging uncertainty, this is merely symptomatic of the high costs of 
inflation in these emerging markets. For this, and the above-cited reasons, failure to 
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